This article investigates how and why Austrian parties have (re)constructed claims of national sovereignty and brought them to the centre of political competition. Theoretically, claims for national sovereignty are directed at recovering the people's autonomy from 'sinister' elites and 'harmful' outsiders like immigrants. As such claims vary in terms of policy content, salience, and discursive means, this article uses the analysis of manifestos and speeches to ascertain how the radical-right populist Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) constructed sovereignty claims in 2013 and 2017. Furthermore, it shows how the mainstream right Austrian People's Party (ÖVP) adopted these claims, significantly narrowing the gap to the far-right FPÖ on the national and economic dimension of sovereignty, and largely renounced its pro-European and antisovereignist positions by 2017. In a second step, we examine whether the claims by these two parties match the preferences of their voters. Here, the findings suggest that the FPÖ's sovereignty claims broadly correspond to the demands of its voters whereas ÖVP voters only partially express support for such claims, mainly on the national sovereignty investigating in detail the form and conditions of their occurrence.
Introduction
After decades of globalization and denationalization (Kriesi et al., 2006) , radical-right and, as of recently, centre-right parties across Western Europe are rediscovering and reclaiming the values of sovereignty (Hainsworth, 2016; Meguid, 2005; Meijers, 2017; Pytlas, 2015) . For European democracies, the latter part of the twentieth century was defined by deepening integration so that differences between nations and their borders seemed to disappear, giving way to new, supranational governance mechanisms and transnational identities. However, in the wake of multiple crises, political actors across European party systems have responded to the new socio-political circumstances by calling for the reassertion of greater national control over internationally shared policy areas. They have also advocated 'handing back the power to the people', suggesting (inter-)national elites had for too long served only their own agenda. Being an integrated part of an increasingly globalized world, Austria has not been exempted from these developments.
Our research is motivated by recent changes in Austrian party politics that have particularly affected the Christian-conservative Austrian People's Party (ÖVP) and the radical-right populist Freedom Party (FPÖ) . Stuck in third place among Austria's major parties for most of the time in the period between 2013 and 2017, the ÖVP went through a rapid succession of different party leaders culminating in the ascendance of the young Sebastian Kurz to the leadership post shortly before the 2017 national election. Although the FPÖ had led the opinion polls for most of the time prior to 2017, it had remained politically isolated. As a result, it increasingly signalled its willingness to moderate its positions somewhat (Akkerman, de Lange, & Rooduijn, 2015) in order to join a coalition with one of the mainstream parties with which its agenda was sufficiently compatible. Whereas the ÖVP had traditionally been the country's staunchest advocate of European integration, even calling itself Europapartei (party of Europe), the FPÖ had long been a champion of 'taking back control'. Recently, these calls for national autonomy and their underlying arguments have been taken up by the mainstream right under Kurz. He has since led his party to victory in the 2017 elections and assumed the position of chancellor in a coalition with the FPÖ.
Using data derived from party manifestos and party leader speeches, this article analyses how Austrian parties on the political right have constructed calls for 'renationalization'. The ÖVP appears to be moving from the pro-integration position to a stance that is increasingly sceptical of internationalization. As this development is neither uniform nor clear-cut, it is not yet well understood. Thus, this article examinesin light of the Austrian casehow radical-right populist and right-wing mainstream parties construct sovereignist claims, the extent to which these claims are similar, and whether or not they develop in similar ways. This entails first disentangling claims towards national, popular, and economic sovereignty (Basile & Mazzoleni, 2019, pp. 6-7) . Second, we analyse which policy areas are most often seen as a priority for reasserting sovereignty. Against this backdrop, finally, we investigate how such appeals to sovereignty are connected with voter demand and whether demand-side explanations, might therefore drive party change.
The right reclaims national, economic, and popular sovereignty Over the past decade, party positions along with voters' attitudes have clearly shifted to the right in the context of Europe's multiple crises (Krzyżanowski, 2017; Luo, 2017) . The seeming inability of political institutions to anticipate and prevent the economic and financial crises of 2008, and the related Eurozone debt crisis that began in 2010, undermined trust in mainstream political elites and European institutions. Nationally unpopular policy decisions by supranational institutions, such as the imposition of sanctions on Russia, have fuelled this anger and mistrust. Radical-right populist and conservative parties across Europe were well positioned to pick up on these sentiments. Whereas the former benefitted from their history of Euroscepticism and anti-globalization rhetoric, the conservatives could point to their association with cultural traditionalism and regionalism.
Populism may be understood as an ideological construct or claim (present in a discourse or set of attitudes) postulating an antagonism between the 'people' and the 'others' in a Manichean manner. As such, the sovereignty of the people is the essential element of the populist discourse. As Basile and Mazzoleni (in the introduction of this issue) argue in this issue, sovereignism, conceived as the need to restore national sovereignty and re-territorialise state power, bonds together all populist movements. By emphasizing internal and external threats to sovereignty, sovereignism often becomes a self-proclaimed raison d'être of populist actors. Nonetheless, right-wing populists share concerns about sovereignty with conservatives and other parties of the right. Thus, calls for sovereignism are expected to closely resemble different aspects of both radical-right and populist positions, as sovereignism shares nativism with the former and people-centredness and elite-scepticism with the latter. Theory would lead us to surmise, however, that there are distinctive aspects about sovereignty that pertain primarily to populism as will be shown below.
For the case of the Austrian political system, this raises several questions: First, how have the radical-right populist FPÖ and the conservative ÖVP constructed such claims about the need to regain popular, national, and/or economic sovereignty? Second, which policy areas have been primarily targeted in conjunction with this strategy? Third, are there differences between the radical-right populist Freedom Party and the conservative People's Party? Here the issue is to what extent the ÖVP has adopted the populist aspects of sovereignty claims. And finally, it also raises the question of the extent to which developments on the supply side are rooted in the preferences of those who vote for either the ÖVP or the FPÖ. In the Austrian political system, the FPÖ has for a long time been the only potential representative of voters with sovereignist positions. In general, the dominant party and representation literature assumes that parties seek to win elections and thus take up positions that are favourable amongst their supporters (Downs, 1957) .
Knowing that populism is not just a supply-side phenomenon, but is also shaped by the demand side, we shed light on voters' preferences and changes from 2013 to 2017. We make the theoretical assumptions that the sovereignty preferences expressed by populist and conservative parties are matched by their voters. Thus, we would expect to see populist evidence of a preference for popular sovereignty with FPÖ voters, whereas conservative party voters show the least support for economic protectionism (economic sovereignty), but relatively the most for national sovereignty.
National, economic, and popular sovereignty and their causes
In our first research question, we turn to the target of sovereignist claims. The assertion of sovereignist values intersects with a broad range of policy areas but depends on the particular goals a political actor hopes to achieve. It is the latter that shapes the framing of such messages. In keeping with the conceptual outline of the special issue, we focus explicitly on three equally important variants of sovereignism: national, economic, and popular sovereignism. The former seeks to defend national borders against external rather than internal 'threats'. Its narrative is based on an alleged dichotomy between the nation's 'own people' and the cultural 'others', describing how rapidly worsening conditions and growing polarization between the two antagonistic groups and between the national people and supranational elites and institutions require a radical change of direction as a matter of national urgency.
While national sovereignism focuses on the defence of the 'good people' against the cultural other, economic sovereignism refers to the idea that economic policies should be primarily beneficial for the 'own' people's wealth. Triggered by the loss of national control over economic developments due to globalization, as was highlighted by the global financial crisis, claims for economic sovereignty address the perceived threat to the jobs and welfare of the national people. Rejection of international trade agreements, 'bringing jobs back' from other countries, and closing the national labour market to nonnational workers are examples for such claims. In making such policy proposals, populists seek to capitalize on the sentiments of working class voters and those feeling economically disadvantaged (Betz & Meret, 2012; Brubaker, 2017; Moffitt, 2016) .
The third variant, popular sovereignism, is a closely related narrative. It first refers to claims that the sovereign 'people' are the only source for legitimating political power and authority (Spruyt, Keppens, & van Droogenbroeck, 2016, p. 336) and implies that supranational bodies represent unaccountable elites whose interests are divorced from those of the 'true people'. This populist argument extends to the domestic arena and, for instance, stands in conflict with parliamentarism by alleging that contemporary political systems are dominated by 'corrupt political elites' working against the interests of the 'good people'. Popular sovereignism and other variants such as national sovereignism may appear together, so that opposition to the EU may be motivated by charges of a 'democratic deficit' in decision-making and/or by fears of being controlled by 'foreign' interests. Likewise, the references to permeable borders and the influx of migrants tap into the same national sovereignist logic alleging that far-away political elites do not care about or are wilfully complicit in these developments. Against this, popular sovereignist claims put forth the idea of 'handing back the power to the people' through direct democratic tools.
Of the three types of sovereignty, we would expect the populistsin this case the FPÖto put the greatest emphasis on popular sovereignty, when compared to their conservative competitors. Moreover, Taggart writing about Populism's 'empty heart' (2000, p. 4) and Kitschelt (1995) discussing populism's winning formulas both suggest that populists are especially skilled in advancing ambivalent and contradictory positions. Thus, claims combining leftist objectives such as economic protectionism with far-right ideas such as nationalism should be expected in the case of the FPÖ. By contrast, we would assume a conservative pro-business party like the ÖVP (or its electorate) to share many of the FPÖ's positions on national sovereignty, but be more moderate on economic and popular sovereignty.
Which policy fields are targeted in constructing national, economic, and popular sovereigntyand how?
Turning now to specific policy positions, we wonder which issue areas are at the centre of sovereignist claims and how they connect to the national, economic, and popular sovereignty dimensions. As populism is a 'thin ideology' (Stanley, 2008) , it does not prescribe specific policy positions. However, the stronger focus of the three dimensions of sovereignism on specific societal outcomes allows for a more targeted discussion. Unsurprisingly, policies and politics related to the European Union have been a central theme in the remake of sovereignist claims. In Austria and elsewhere, conservatives found themselves at a crossroads between remaining pro-Europeans oras has been observable during the last decadeadopting a more ambivalent posture (Kriesi et al., 2006; Krzyżanowski, 2017) . Meijers (2017) speaks of 'contagious Euroscepticism' in reference to conservatives shifting their EU policy closer to the discourse practiced by the far right. For the construction of sovereignist claims in Austria, this means that EU issues are selectively employed by pointing to the benefit of EU membership whenever it is expedient. This may take the form of supporting economic integration and even military cooperation to secure EU borders while simultaneously rejecting EU institutions as 'enemies' wilfully working against Austrian interests. For our analysis, it will be particularly interesting to see to what degree this equivocal Euroscepticism (Heinisch, McDonnell, & Werner, 2018) plays out in parties' manifestos and leader speeches, as well as which particular areas serve as the basis for giving EU policy a sovereignist 'Austria first' spin.
The reassertion of sovereignty is by no means limited to criticism of European integration. Claims of economic sovereignism will likely also find expression in the rejection of international and multilateral trade agreements and hostility to all that supposedly threatens national economic autonomy. Nonetheless, this presents parties on the mainstream right with a strategic dilemma since 'economically they tend to endorse liberalization, but socially and culturally they tend to be nationalists and opposed to the opening up of borders' (Kriesi et al., 2006, p. 927) . Thus, capitalizing on nationalist economic messages holds greater appeal.
With regard to national sovereignism, immigration policy has been one of the most prominent areas for re-asserting such claims (Krzyżanowski, 2017) . This allows parties to mobilize on fears of security risks and also provides an expedient response to salient issues such as the refugee crises. Positions favouring greater border security and more restrictive immigration policies alongside strict 'law and order' positions are directly connected with calls to [preserve] 'one's own culture' against what is deemed 'foreign' and 'harmful' (Bale, 2008) . As these two policy areas provide clear opportunities for re-asserting national-sovereignist values and have become especially salient, we would expect centreright and far-right parties to develop pronounced and clear postures on these issues.
Related to immigration and integration policies are social policies where the central claim is about taking action against 'welfare abuse' and regulating labour market mobility for the benefit of one's 'own people' (Bale, 2010) . Schumacher and van Kersbergen (2014) suggest that such claims serve a 'back to the nation-state' function which is also central to the politics of identity, culture and religion (Hafez, 2014) . Analytically, we would therefore expect to find both the centre right and far right to emphasize identity politics equally strongly and present the 'risk of Islam' as a serious threat to national sovereignty.
Finally, as calls for popular sovereignty are focused on procedural aspects of transferring decision-making capacity from the elites directly to the people, these could be connected to any policy field. Based on the definition of popular sovereignty, such claims are most likely calling for the renationalization of decision-making competences, or for the introduction of direct democratic instruments for any salient policy issue.
The Austrian party system and the construction of sovereignty
Before turning to the empirical part, we need to introduce the Austrian case and the two political parties at the centre of the analysis. Since entering the European Union in 1995, Austria has experienced a growing salience of cultural and immigration issues, compared to economic questions resulting in voter sentiments of deprivation from self-determination (Dolezal, 2008; Kriesi et al., 2006) . Against this backdrop, rediscovering and reframing sovereignist values has played a major role, making the country a crucial case for the analysis of parties and candidates operating with such appeals.
In the context of post-war economic growth and modernization resulting in the disappearance of traditional political milieus, Christian democratic and conservative parties moved to the centre, as new middle and professional classes became willing constituents who supported a more liberal and internationalist policy orientation (Heinisch, 2002) . Pursuing a staunchly pro-European agenda, centre-conservative parties could also distinguish themselves politically from the centre left that had for a long time been more sceptical of the promises of market integration and economic authority transfer to the supranational level. This was especially the case in Austria where the ÖVP took the lead in the early 1980s in reorienting the country's SPÖ-led global foreign policy orientation of the previous decade to an almost exclusively Europe-centred strategy (Heinisch, 2002; Luif, 1995) . As Social Democratic parties followed suit and also became champions of European integration and liberal internationalism, which was the case in Austria from the mid-1980s onward, only the radical-right populists and the left remained opposed to this direction. When the Austrian Greens changed their position on the country's EU membership in the wake of overwhelming support for Austria's accession to the EU in a referendum in 1994, the FPÖ became the only party in parliament to offer a political home to Eurosceptical voters.
Examining sovereigntist appeals in Austrian party competition requires a systematic mapping of how such claims unfold and whether they match with the preferences of these parties. Thus, the central question of our analysis is how this is achieved (which policy areas are addressed for what goals) and in what way these claims are presented (i.e. content, direction and scope). Subsequently, we turn to the voters of the two parties to ascertain where and to what extent there is demand for the policy shifts we observe. This analysis rests on the crucial assumption that parties are at least partially vote-seeking and thus reactive to the shifts in their voters' opinions (e.g. Downs, 1957) .
Methods: measuring claims of national, economic, and popular sovereignty
How do the FPÖ and ÖVP construct their claims of national sovereignty and in which policy areas does this agenda become visible? To answer these questions, we conduct a text analysis of (a) the two parties' election manifestos in 2013 and 2017 as the primary and condensed outlet for the party programmes, and (b) of parliamentary speeches by the party leaders from 2013 to the end of 2017, which provide more room for nuance and argumentation. The speeches analysed are those of party leaders and the respective heads of the party's parliamentary factionthe two most important national-level representatives of each party. These were Heinz-Christian Strache (party leader) and Herbert Kickl (head of faction) for the FPÖ, and Michael Spindelegger, Reinhold Mitterlehner, and Sebastian Kurz (party leaders within this period) and Reinhold Lopakta (head of faction) for the ÖVP.
The content analysis for both manifesto and speeches consists of three steps. First, we identify all claims regarding sovereignty. In accordance with the conceptual frameworks, these text fragments are then categorized into national, economic, and popular claims. Furthermore, we identified statements making claims against Austrian sovereignty, such as those expressing preferences for transferring new powers from the national to the supranational level. The main analysis is based on the four manifestos, allowing for a systematic and comparative investigation of how the two parties construct sovereignty and whether any changes occurred from 2013 to 2017. The speeches provide important additional information for contextualizing seemingly contradictory or vague claims.
We define 'asserting national sovereignty and autonomy' as all those claims seeking to defend or maintain national authority over certain values and policy areas. The resulting claims usually range from one to three sentences. The second analytical step encompassed the categorization of the claims into national, economic, and popular sovereignty statements in line with our conceptualization. In a final step, each statement was attributed to one of the following policy areas: immigration, security, EU and foreign policy, Austrian values, education, social policy, work, economy, agriculture and environment, administration and state reform, as well as direct democracy. Claims spanning various policy areas were recorded on multiple sovereignty dimensions to accurately capture their complexity, but attributed to the best-fitting policy area to allow for meaningful interpretation; in the overall analysis, these crossovers were taken into account.
Analysis: the sovereignty claims of the Austrian radical right and mainstream right
To answer the question of how the radical-right Freedom Party (FPÖ) and the mainstreamright People's Party (ÖVP) (re)constructed Austrian sovereignty, this section analyses their manifestos and leadership speeches between 2013 and 2017 in terms of national, economic, and popular sovereignty. This analysis focuses on (a) the scope of the sovereignty claims in each dimensionby assessing the number and type of policies to which these claims were connected, and (b) the degree to which these sovereignty claims were made, indicating how intensely the party and its leaders argued for an increase in Austrian sovereignty. The degree of the claim is assessed by investigating whether specific quantities are set or changed, the presence of urgency or pertinence in the language, and the level of finality in the proposed solution. References to the speeches indicate the speech number and are attributed to the exact date in the appendix.
Reconstructing sovereignty: the Austrian Freedom Party
Reporting the results of the manifesto analysis for 2013 and 2017, Table 1 shows in which policy areas the FPÖ made sovereignty claims and whether the scope and degree of these claims increased over time. In both manifestos, the FPÖ addressed all three dimensions of sovereignty, claiming an expansion of sovereignty is necessary. Furthermore, the scope and degree of these claims, meaning the extensiveness of the policies and the intensiveness of the claims, have increased in most policy areas.
On the dimension of national sovereignty claims, the FPÖ focused on two broad areas. First, it stresses the importance and need to defend specific Austrian values. Command of the German language is defined as a condition for entrance into the education and social systems whereas Austrian cultural identity was emphasized for protecting Austrian media and guarding against the cultural influence of Islam. Such sentiments feature heavily in the speeches of Herbert Kickl and Heinz-Christian Strache, who claim immigration reduces the quality of life for Austrians, leads to crime ('parallel societies') (Strache 24), and introduces an alien Muslim population incompatible with Austrian society (Kickl). National sovereignty claims also concern 'Austrian interests' with respect to broader institutional influences. Central to this is the constitutionally enshrined principle of Austrian (military) neutrality, which is to be protected from non-neutral European foreign policy decisions and a push to build up national defence capabilities. While neutrality was a central issue in both 2013 and 2017, the latter manifesto expanded on this issue in a reaction to the refugee crisis after 2015. National Austrian interests now also required protection through a fortified European border and, where that was not possible, through a strong national border defence. The economic sovereignty dimension focused on the protection of the socio-economic interests of individual Austrians and the Austrian economy in general. In both manifestos, the FPÖ expressed grave concern about how foreigners impinge on the socio-economic interests of Austrian citizens, especially by competing for jobs and accessing public welfare. While the 2013 manifesto saw European migrants mainly in terms of draining finite Austrian resources, the 2017 manifesto expanded the circle of 'undeserving others' to asylum seekers. The protection of Austrian workers against foreign competitors was a particular focus for Kickl, who used very militaristic language when linking economic sovereignty to matters of 'national defence' (Kickl 3) and labourmarket policy to 'self-defence' (Kickl 4). Secondly, the FPÖ was concerned about the protection of the Austrian economy from the harmful effects of EU or international policy measures. Here, we find that sovereignty claims changed. In 2013 the main focus lay with the EU's monetary and financial policies that were depicted as draining resources from the Austrian economy and the taxpayer. This included concerns about the extent of the Austrian contribution to the EU budget and the liabilities incurred due to the different financial stabilization mechanisms adopted by the Eurozone. Kickl also emphasized the need to protect 'Austrian economic standards' from those of the EU (Kickl 1). The 2017 manifesto adds calls for building up Austria's agricultural self-sufficiency, staying out of international trade agreements like TTIP, and resisting an alleged EU plan to abolish cash money.
On the popular dimension of sovereignty, the FPÖ calls for expanding direct democracy in both manifestos, but goes into greater detail in 2017. Only in 2017 do the demands for more direct democracy include a list of specific institutional changes aimed at bringing the Austrian system closer to the Swiss model. Similarly, both Kickl and Strache call for Austrians to be given the opportunity to decide on specific EU initiatives (i.e. leaving the Euro, introduction of EU tax, etc.) through a binding referendum. However, neither the manifesto nor the speeches state explicitly that plebiscitary democratic mechanisms should generally replace parliamentary decision-making. In fact, Strache stresses that these measures are meant to complement parliamentary democracy (Strache 11).
The 2017 FPÖ manifesto also adds the demand for the renationalization of certain decision-making competences and warns against any further transfers of authority away from Austria. Although introduced only in the most recent manifesto, these points have been prominent features in FPÖ speeches for much longer. For instance, Strache rejected the idea of a 'European central state' (23), opposing transferring any competences in immigration policy to the EU (Strache 7). He also called for the Austrian government to reclaim the authority to control its own borders (e.g. Strache 12, 13, 14, 16) . Both Kickl and Strache made frequent claims based on popular sovereignty when accusing the government of failing to represent the Austrian people. Kickl called the government the 'stooge' and 'extended work bench' of the European Commission (Kickl 2), and also 'agents' of the European Union (Kickl 3). Strache criticized the Austrian government's agreement with the German government, calling them 'the parrot of [Angela] Merkel' (Strache 8). In sum, FPÖ speeches address both the national and supranational level in their Eurosceptic and anti-establishment rhetoric. This finding underscores the populist nature of the Freedom Party and marks a distinction to the ÖVP.
In sum, the FPÖ makes sovereignty-related claims in a wide variety of policy areas. Central to both national and economic sovereignty claims is that the FPÖ is very clear about privileging the perceived interests of the core, traditional Austrian population over many economic, social and cultural concerns. When it comes to popular sovereignty, the FPÖ calls for national political decision-making and considers it generally superior to international decision-making. While the FPÖ also demands expanding plebiscitary opportunities, we do not find evidence that the FPÖ claims opposition to parliamentarism itself.
Reconstructing sovereignty: the Austrian People's Party Table 2 shows the policy areas in which the ÖVP made sovereignty claims in its 2013 and 2017 manifestos. One strong contrast to the FPÖ manifesto is immediately discernible. In 2013, the ÖVP had a number of policies that called for a continued absence or further yielding of Austrian sovereignty (marked in italics in Table 2 ), which are also prevalent in the leaders' speeches. With the exception of the creation of a European border defence force, these types of 'anti'-sovereignty claims have vanished in the 2017 manifesto. Furthermore, both the degree and the scope of existing sovereignty claims increased in the documents. In the speeches, the shift towards more sovereignist claims has been subtler, even though Kurz has clearly granted these statements more attention and appears more Eurosceptic than his predecessors.
On the level of national sovereignist claims, Table 2 shows a clear increase in scope and degree from 2013 to 2017. While the basic sovereignist claims, especially the importance of the German language and Austrian values, were present in 2013, these were extended in the 2017 document. We find an even stronger shift in the leaders' speeches, which first focused on anti-sovereignist claims in favour of an open country in the 'Austrian humanist tradition', arguing that to suggest otherwise would be an 'insult' (Mitterlehner 20). Furthermore, Lopatka (31) made clear that Islam, just like Judaism, was part of Austrian society. Over time, these claims were replaced by clear sovereignist statements focusing on the need for immigrants to learn German and adopt Austrian values (e.g. Kurz 1), the struggle of integration (Mitterlehner 29), and the dangers of Islamic parallel societies (Kurz 3). By 2017, the ÖVP's national sovereignist claims resemble those of the FPÖ.
In the manifesto, we find a similar shift in the degree and scope of sovereignist claims on the economic-sovereignty dimension. The 2013 manifesto highlights the socio-economic advantages of European integration and international trade agreements, arguing for a further strengthening of these ties and thus less national sovereignty, but more general welfare. This was alsoand remained over timethe position in the leaders' speeches. For instance, both Mitterlehner (32, 40) and Lopatka (23) argued extensively for the benefits of free-trade and international climate agreements. Lopatka (22) went so far to deny prioritizing Austrian economic well-being in connection to the EU sanctions against Russia. In the 2017 manifesto, the ÖVP made a strong economic-sovereignist turn, stressing the need to protect the Austrian job market and welfare system from immigration, but also calling for changes within the European system to protect the Austrian state budget. The only corresponding aspects in the speeches was a move away from arguing that immigrants are economically advantageous (Lopatka 40), to focusing on pressures created for the welfare system (but not the job market) (Kurz 3, Lopatka 48 & 51). On the popular-sovereignty dimension, we find a shift from many anti-sovereignty claims in 2013 to some sovereignty claims in 2017, which was again more strongly evident in the manifesto than in the speeches. This is particularly the case for the distribution of decision-making competences. 1 In the 2013 manifestos, we find multiple claims for strong(er) inter-and supra-national decision-making, both as general principles and with regards to trade, the environment, and security policies. The same claims were present in the leader speeches that focused on the superiority of international trade and environmental agreements and the centrality of the European Union decision-making for Austria. Mitterlehner argues 'the EU, that is us' (20); the EU brings advantages but also duties, and the centrality of solidarity (e.g. Mitterlehner 30, also Lopatka 44). The ÖVP leaders stressed that solutions should preferably be found at the EU level and national-level decisions were 'a step back' (Lopatka 3). In 2017, the ÖVP dropped most of these anti-sovereignist claims. Further, the 2017 manifesto included popular-sovereignist claims, however, only when stressing national decision-making in reference to the subsidiarity principle. In the speeches, we find one central instance of a clear sovereignist turn: While Lopatka stressed the centrality of EU-level decision-making, he first argued that the involvement of national legislatures was important (21, 24), but over time replaced the parliaments with 'strong nation states' (61, 68). However, there are no explicit claims to re-nationalize decisionmaking competences.
In sum, therefore, on all three dimensions the ÖVP made a switch from anti-sovereignist claims in 2013 to sovereignist claims in 2017. This turn is especially pronounced on the national and economic sovereignty dimensions, where the ÖVP under Kurz adopted strong positions and rhetoric for protecting and strengthening the native Austrian people. This turn coincides with a leadership change from Mitterlehner and Lopatkawho were sceptical towards cooperation and convergence with the FPÖto Kurz, who was and is substantially more open to the right. This change is not only reflected in the manifesto, but also in the content of the leadership speeches. While we had not expected the ÖVP to stress economic sovereignty as much as it did, our findings confirm our theoretical assumption that the populist FPÖ puts more emphasis on popular sovereignty. Thus, analysing the parties' manifestos and leader speeches yielded several insights regarding the construction of sovereignist claims. For one, we find that both parties make sovereignty claims on all three dimensions of sovereignty, with the exception of the ÖVP on the populist dimension. Moreover, we observe a shift towards sovereignist values on all three dimensions that cuts across issue areas. Particularly with respect to the EU level, the FPÖ's emphasis on lower-level decision-making ('handing back the power to the people') has grown stronger and touches upon multiple other areas such as trade negotiations or immigration policies and asylum. The ÖVP, on the other hand, reduced anti-sovereignist claims (e.g. open labour-market policies, EU solutions and harmonization, etc.), which parallels the trend towards more nationally-oriented policy positions. Lastly, it is the ÖVP that appears to have undergone the most radical reorientation, abolishing their pro-European stance in favour of more anti-multiculturalist and nationalist positions. This transition subsumes a broad array of policy areas under a sovereignist narrative and even stretches to usually unsuspicious matters such as education policy and the internationalization of tertiary education.
Austrian voters' attitudes and opinion shifts towards sovereignist values
In our analysis of the demand side of how populism relates to sovereignism, we proceed from the same theoretical assumptions laid out earlier. Thus, we expect populist-party voters to support all three sovereignty claims, but to show a special affinity for popular sovereignty. By contrast, we would hypothesize finding the least support for this last category among conservative party voters. To answer this question, we used data from the Austrian national election survey in 2013 and 2017 (Kritzinger et al., 2016; Wagner et al., 2018) and identified survey items that tap into each of the three sovereignty dimensions: national, economic, and popular sovereignist sentiments. Table A3 in the appendix summarizes the details. In the following, we use boxplot graphs and ANOVA analyses (see Table A4 , appendix) to investigate whether (a) the voters of the ÖVP, FPÖ, and all other parties have significantly different views, and (b) whether ÖVP voters' preferences shifted towards FPÖ voters' preferences.
The first measure, shown in Figure 1 , investigates voters' preferences regarding economic sovereignty values. The statement suggesting that 'migrants take away Austrian jobs' taps into respondents' belief that immigration is a threat to the socio-economic well-being of Austrians. Voters' responses in 2013 reveal no significant differences in means between ÖVP supporters and those who cast their votes for other parties, while FPÖ voters had significantly more negative views. In 2017, the picture looked fundamentally different: First, all three voter groupsespecially FPÖ voters and other party votersbecame less convinced of the negative job impact of immigrants, which is surprising, but may be a result of the strong state of economic recovery in Austria when compared with the situation five years earlier. Second, ÖVP and FPÖ voters converged significantly, to the extent that their means were completely aligned. However, this is not a consequence of Figure 1 . Austrian voters' response to 'migrants take jobs away' by party choice. Note: 1: disagree completely; 5: agree completely; N = 1161 (2013), N = 2935 (2017).
ÖVP voters becoming more economically sovereignist, but of FPÖ voters (and other party voters) becoming less so. 2 Thus, the shift of the ÖVP towards more sovereignist claims is not an answer to their voters' attitudinal 'development'.
Figures 2 and 3 investigate the voters' preferences on the national dimension of sovereignism. In terms of voters' attitudes to European integration, Figure 2 shows that both ÖVP and FPÖ voters became more negative towards the EU from 2013 to 2017. In 2013, there was no significant difference in means between the voters of the ÖVP and other parties, but such a difference did exist in 2017. The difference in means between ÖVP and FPÖ voters was significant in both years and decreased only slightly, from 2.7 to 2.0 scale points. Thus, we find some convergence between the two parties' sets of voters, which is in line with the direction of the ÖVP's sovereignty claims in 2017. Figure 3 shows a similar result for the perceived cultural impact of migration on Austrian values and traditions. Even though the attitudes of ÖVP voters and those of other parties were already statistically distinguishable in 2013, the gap was larger in 2017 and, at the same time, ÖVP voters' positions had moved closer to those held by FPÖ supporters: both far-right and conservative voters perceived the cultural impact of migration to be very extensive in 2017. Thus, we do find convergence between these two voter groups on this indicator corresponding to the party's behaviour: FPÖ voters became even stronger in their already established conviction, while ÖVP voters moved in the same direction.
Finally, for the popular dimension of sovereignty claims, we only have data available from 2017 and, thus, can draw limited inferences. Figure 4 shows the proportion of policy areas that respondents want handled at the national level. FPÖ voters prefer on average that 74.1 percent of policies should be decided upon only by the national government (as opposed to 'together within the EU'), while ÖVP voters preferred for 62 percent of all areas to be decided only nationally. By contrast, only slightly more than half of all policy areas (53 percent) should be handled nationally according to the supporters of other parties. This suggests there are differences as to how exclusively national decision-making should unfold. While the FPÖ mirrors its voters' strong preference for far-reaching national competences, the ÖVP's electorate seem to be stronger proponents of 'taking back the control' than is their party.
While Figure 4 displays preferences for moving decision-making power from the international to the national level, Figure 5 shows the preferences for moving this power from elected officials to the people via direct democracy. While ÖVP and other party voters take a neutral position on this question, favouring neither more nor less direct democracy, FPÖ voters have a significantly higher preference for direct democratic decision-making. Thus, FPÖ claims for the introduction of the 'Swiss model' are in line with their voters' preferences. The ÖVP made comparatively weak claims regarding direct democracy in 2017, which seem in line with their voters' neutral position.
In sum, the attitudes of the two parties' voters shifted markedly on all three dimensions from 2013 to 2017. This development only partially matches the parties' claims and partially runs counter to their developments. Thus, voter preferences regarding sovereignty cannot consistently explain the party claims. On the national dimension, ÖVP voters moved considerably closer to FPÖ voters. This corresponds to a trend at the party level, which has resulted in a strong campaign emphasis on 'Austrian values' and 'tradition'. However, no such developments took place on the economic dimension of sovereignism where it was FPÖ voters that turned more moderate, thus bringing their attitudes closer to those of conservative voters. By contrast, ÖVP voters maintained stable centrist attitudes. By comparison, the ÖVP's manifesto, and to a lesser degree the leader speeches, showed a much greater swing towards sovereignist claims. This split is likely caused by the perceived trade-off between liberal, open-market positions and nationalist, culturally isolationist values. In order to provide a relatively coherent campaign message, the party may have sought to combine these two aspects. Likewise, our analysis of the popular sovereignty dimensions, for which we only had data from 2017, reveals a rather large gap between FPÖ and ÖVP voters. Conservative voters appear less supportive of forms of direct democracy and the 'Swiss model' than are their far-right counterparts. This matches the parties' positions, but such a neutral stance on popular sovereignty is unlikely to cause conflicts with the FPÖ.
Conclusion
Decades of globalization and denationalization have generated sentiments of profound discontent, culminating in counter reactions that come in some form of populist attitudes and actors (Kriesi et al., 2006) . Populist radical-right and, more recently, centre-right parties across Western political systems have therefore rediscovered and reclaimed seemingly lost values in a nostalgic yearning for self-determination (Hainsworth, 2016; Meijers, 2017) . In Austria, as elsewhere, this has not left the character of party competition unaffected. Specifically, the perception that Austrian sovereignty had been undermined resonated strongly with many voters. Consequently, whereas the FPÖ had been a constant advocate of Austrian sovereignty (despite adopting a somewhat softer tone in its 2017 election campaign), the 'New' ÖVP under Sebastian Kurz was now also discovering the salience of a 'take back the control' programme.
As no systematic approach to analyse these developments had been undertaken, this article examined the respective election manifestos of the ÖVP and the FPÖ from 2013 and 2017. It also examined the party leadership speeches during this period, identifying claims that support or counter national, economic, and popular sovereignty. In doing so, we conceptualized the relationship between radical-right populist and conservative actors and their voters, on one hand, and the three dimensions of sovereignism on the other. Furthermore, we analysed voter data to see whether the shifts at the party level corresponded to those at the citizens' level. We find that both parties used a range of policies to underscore their sovereignty claims. While the populist FPÖ covered all three sovereignty dimensions, the ÖVP focused on national and economic sovereignty. Following a change in the party leadership, the ÖVP renounced its anti-sovereignist and pro-European claims and instead adopted many of the FPÖ claims rooted in national and economic dimensions of sovereignty. At the same time, the ÖVP has avoided becoming more populist, as it did not adopt the Manichean notion between the 'good' people and the 'bad' others. Thus, sovereignist claims are central to right-populist parties like the FPÖ, they are not exclusive to them. As we show, conservative parties like the ÖVP may also adopt sovereignist claims. The crucial difference, however, seems to be the popular sovereignism dimension. While the ÖVP increased its sovereignist claims on the national and economic dimensions, aimed mainly at protecting the nation from outsiders, it did not really embrace claims of popular sovereignism, which advocates putting political decision-making directly into the hands of the people. This, more than anything, marks the contrast to the populist FPÖ.
Turning from the supply to the demand side and testing whether the sovereignist claims of the ÖVP and FPÖ were driven by voter preferences, we find in the second part of our analysis that there is considerable overlap between the FPÖ's sovereignty claims and the preferences of its voters on all three sovereignty dimensions. The gap between the ÖVP and its voters, on the other hand, is larger. While the ÖVP narrowed the programmatic distance to the FPÖ considerably, the voters of the former did not support all of these shifts towards sovereignist values. As we had suggested at the outset, ÖVP voters seemed less in tune with their party on economic sovereignty, despite expressing generally strong preferences for national decision-making and national values. Thus, if the ÖVP reacts to the preferences of its voters, we might see them tone down some of their sovereignist stances again. Notes 1. Neither the ÖVP manifesto nor the speeches were majorly concerned with direct democratic decision-making. While the 2013 manifesto included some calls for such tools, the 2017 manifesto only mentions referendums which, in turn, were rejected by Lopatka in one speech (speech 86). 2. This result is confirmed by Figure A1 (appendix) , which compares the 2017 voter groups' responses to whether immigration had negative impact on the Austrian economy. FPÖ voters agree with this statement significantly more than ÖVP voters.
